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EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh* and James R. McClelland**
RELEVANCY-OTHER CRIMES OR WRONGFUL ACTS
COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED
Other Crimes-Federal Remedy for Defense Counsel's Failure to
Move for Mistrial
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 770 provides in
part:
Upon motion of a defendant, a mistrial shall be ordered
when a remark or comment, made within the hearing of the jury
by the judge, district attorney, or a court official, during the
trial or in argument, refers directly or indirectly to:
'(2) Another crime committed or alleged to have been commit-
ted by the defendant as to which evidence is not admissible;
An admonition to the jury to disregard the remark or com-
ment shall not be sufficient to prevent a mistrial. If the defen-
dant, however, requests that only an admonition be given, the
court shall admonish the jury to disregard the remark or com-
ment but shall not declare a mistrial.
What is a convicted defendant's redress if, in the face of a forbidden
prosecutorial reference to an inadmissible "other crime," his defense
counsel, instead of having moved immediately for a mistrial, suc-
cessfully interposed an objection and, in response to his request,
received an admonition for the jury to disregard the improper
reference? Has the right to a mistrial been effectively waived by his
counsel's non-assertion, or may it be asserted on motion for new
trial, appeal, habeas corpus, etc.?
In 1975 in State v. Nero,' a divided court, pointing to the express
language of the Official Revision Comment to the quoted code article,2
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
**Member, St. Mary Parish Bar.
1. 319 So. 2d 303 (La. 1975).
2. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 770, comment (b) provides: "A failure to move for a
mistrial is a waiver of the error, since this article requires a motion by the defendant."
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said that failure to request a mistrial in this context constituted a
waiver. In a very important subsequent development in federal
court, in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by the same defen-
dant, a unanimous panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held in Nero v. Blackburn' that Nero was entitled
to collateral relief' because of what it found to be ineffective
assistance of counsel, ie., counsel's failure to move for a mistrial
under the circumstances presented. In this connection, the fifth cir-
cuit stated:
We can hardly imagine anything more prejudicial to Nero
than allowing the jury in his armed robbery case to hear the
prosecutor's comments that Nero had been convicted twice
before of burglary and once on drug charges. The jury may well
have convicted Nero of the charged offense because it was
aware of his prior convictions."
The federal court recognized that if defense counsel had made a
1reasonable tactical decision" to object instead of to move for a
mistrial, a very different problem would have been presented. It
found, however, that no such tactical decision had been made in the
instant case, noting that defendant's trial counsel, in a supplemental
motion for a new trial, had stated that he had a civil practice, had
had very little experience in criminal cases, and, at the time of the
trial, had been unaware of defendant's right to a mistrial under the
circumstances. The federal Nero case seems to these writers ex-
tremely important, rendering Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:445 and
446 and the Prieur' line of cases of even greater significance.
A short time before Nero v. Blackburn was handed down by the
fifth circuit, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Morgan7 again
held that by failure to move at trial for mistrial because of a pur-
ported improper prosecutorial reference to an extraneous crime,
defense counsel was precluded from asserting the right to mistrial
on appeal. In this connection, the court stated: "[T]his Court has held
on a number of occasions that it is necessary to lodge a contem-
poraneous objection to be entitled to a mistrial; failure to make the
motion is considered a waiver of the error."8 If unable to secure
3. 597 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1979).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1966).
5. 597 F.2d at 994.
6. State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
7. 367 So. 2d 779 (La. 1979).
8. Id. at 784 (citations omitted). See also State v. Lawrence, 365 So. 2d 1356 (La.
1979) (involving defense counsel's non-assertion at trial of a purported violation of
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination and defense counsel's failure to move
for a mistrial).
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relief on direct appeal, defendants in this situation, in light of Nero
v. Blackburn, may seek collateral relief through habeas corpus.
Other Crimes- Continued Adherence to State v. Prieur
As usual, a number of cases decided during the past year con-
cerned the admissibility of "other crimes" evidence.' In general, the
cases reflect strong, continued adherence by a majority of the court
to the Prieur" line of cases -implementing the protective policy of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:445 and 446 regarding the admissibili-
ty of "other crimes" evidence.
Perhaps the most forceful case showing continued dedication to
the principles of Prieur is State v. Morris." Defendant was charged
with first degree murder of her sixteen-month-old child. At a
pretrial hearing, the trial court had held that, at the trial on the
merits, the prosecution would be permitted to show that three years
previously defendant had pleaded guilty to manslaughter of another
of her children, then three months old, and that six years prior to that
defendant had pleaded guilty to two instances of aggravated battery on
yet another of her children, one then six months old. The supreme
court granted writs and reversed the interlocutory order, holding
that testimony as to prior acts regarding other children was inad-
missible to show that she specifically intended to kill the child in
question. The court noted that there was no evidence that defendant
had any "plan" to liquidate her children or any "system" of killing
her children (e.g., to collect insurance on them). It found further that
the purported prior acts had little, if any, probative value toward
establishing that, at the time of the alleged act against the instant
child, defendant specifically intended to kill him or inflict great bodi-
ly harm. It held, however, that whatever probative value the prior
acts might have had was outweighed by the risk that the jury would
ascribe an undue weight to such evidence.'"
9. State v. Coleman, 369 So. 2d 1286 (La. 1979); State v. Jackson, 367 So. 2d 353
(La. 1979); State v. Hamilton, 364 So. 2d 585 (La. 1978); State v. Monroe, 364 So. 2d 570
(La. 1978); State v. Morris, 362 So. 2d 1379 (La. 1978); State v. May, 362 So. 2d 516 (La.
1978); State v. Showers, 359 So. 2d 104 (La. 1978).
10. State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973), discussed in Comment, Other
Crimes Evidence in Louisiana-To Show Knowledge, Intent, System, etc., in the Case
in Chief, 33 LA. L. REV. 614 (1973), reprinted in G. PUGH, LOUISIANA EVIDENCE LAW 30
(1974); and discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973
Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1972-1973 Term],
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra, at 101 (Supp. 1978).
11. 362 So. 2d 1379 (La. 1978).
12. See State v. Moore, 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973), discussed in 1972-1973 Term,
supra note 10, at 443, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 101 (Supp. 1978). See also
FED. R. EVID. 403.
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A case which seems to these writers to be far less in accord
with the scrupulous concern expressed in Prieur as to the impact
upon the jury of information brought to its attention regarding in-
admissible "other crimes" evidence is State v. May.3 On the morn-
ing May was brought to trial for aggravated criminal damage to
property, as the prospective jurors were in court awaiting examina-
tion on voir dire, the prosecuting attorney moved to postpone
another criminal case against the defendant set for trial the same
day, one charging defendant with possession of a controlled
dangerous substance with intent to distribute. The supreme court
affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for mistrial in
the instant case, finding that there ! was "no showing in this record
that any of the prospective jurors heard the State's attorney refer
to the narcotic charge against defendant."'" The court went on to
say that even if it had been shown that the prospective jurors heard
the statement, defendant was not entitled to a mistrial 6 because, at
the time the incident in question took place, defendant's trial had
not yet commenced since no juror had yet been called for examina-
tion. In a concurring opinion, Justice Dennis indicated that if it had
been shown that any of defendant's jurors had heard the remark in
question, defendant's conviction should have been reversed."
The writers fully agree with Justice Dennis. The theory underly-
ing Code of Criminal Procedure article 770(2) appears to be that
reference to inadmissible "other crimes" evidence is "so damaging,
and an admonition to disregard of such dubious utility, that public
officials should be definitively dissuaded from bringing same to the
attention of the jury. Whether prosecutorial reference to an ex-
traneous crime is made before or after the first juror is examined, it
13. 362 So. 2d 516 (La. 1978).
14. Id. at 517. The court went on the state:
But, assuming that they did hear him, subsequent examination of the jurors on
voir dire could have served to enable defense counsel to question them concerning
the motion and ascertain from them whether, with that knowledge, they could
serve impartially and be guided only by the evidence to be adduced at trial.
However, this was not done. Furthermore, as the State's attorney pointed out,
the narcotic charge against May had been publicized in the newspapers and was a
public record open to inspection by anyone.
Id,
15. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 770(2) provides:
Upon motion of a defendant, a mistrial shall be ordered when a remark or com-
ment, made within the hearing of the jury by the judge, district attorney, or a
court official, during the trial or in argument, refers directly or indirectly to:
(2) Another crime committed or alleged to have been committed by the defen-
dant as to which evidence is not admissible.
16. 362 So. 2d at 518 (Dennis, J., concurring).
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is submitted, has relatively very little significance as to the degree
of prejudicial effect, and the spirit of article 770 seems to embrace
such references concerning defendant if heard by his jurors.
RELEVANCY-CHARACTER TESTIMONY
IN CRIMINAL CASES
Character of Defendant-Drug Courier "Detroit Profile"
Characteristics
As to a person charged with possession of heroin with intent to
distribute, is it permissible for the state to show (1) on a motion to
suppress or (2) at the trial on the merits that the defendant at the
time of this initial stopping by the authorities at an airport possessed
certain characteristics common to persons acting as drug couriers,
and thus to some extent fit a recognized police profile of such per-
sons?17 The problem was explored at considerable length in State v.
Brown. 8
On a motion to suppress evidence, the pertinent issue is the
legality of the investigative stop or arrest which preceded the pat-
down or search that produced the evidence sought to be suppressed.
In determining the validity of the stop or arrest, the question is
whether the officer had probable cause- sufficient basis to justify
his contested conduct. The majority of the court held in Brown that,
in such a hearing, the prosecution may properly adduce testimony
by a narcotics agent as to the characteristics found to be common to
drug couriers at airports (the so-called "Detroit Profile"). With this
the writers do not disagree. Such a hearing is before a judge
without a jury, and it is well for him in determining the
reasonableness of the officer's conduct to be apprised by competent
testimony as to the results of police studies regarding the
characteristics of persons engaged in such nefarious trade.
As recognized by the majority in Brown, however, a different
problem is presented when, at the trial itself, the prosecution seeks
to introduce testimony by narcotics agents as to the "Detroit Pro-
file." In such context, said the court, the evidence was irrelevant.
17. The "Detroit Profile" involved here, as described in State v. Brown, 370 So.
2d 547, 553 (La. 1979), is a pattern developed by the Detroit office of the federal Drug
Enforcement Agency describing thirteen characteristics, one or more of which are fre-
quently said to be present as to drug couriers coming into a city by plane, including
such things as arrival from a city where there is a large narcotics traffic, nervousness,
limited amount of baggage, use of an alias, use of a one way ticket, buying a ticket
with cash, making a telephone call soon after arrival, relatively short period of stay,
etc.
18. 370 So. 2d 547 (La. 1979).
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Even if deemed relevant, continued the majority, the probative
value of the testimony was so outweighed by the risk of undue pre-
judice that it should have been held inadmissible, and the danger
was so great that the trial court's admission of the testimony
necessitated reversal.
The writers fully agree that whatever probative value the
evidence may have had at trial, its evidentiary value was clearly out-
weighed by the risk of undue prejudice." At the motion to suppress,
the issue for the judge was probable cause, that is, the propriety of
the officer's action in stopping the defendant; at the trial, the issue
for the trier of fact was whether the defendant was in fact guilty of
the crime charged. In the latter context, the fact that defendant had
certain characteristics in common with guilty people was far too pre-
judicial to be admissible. To admit it would smack too much of
establishing "guilt by association."
Character of Victim-Disturbed Mental State of Victim
Known to Defendant
Does the rule of Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:482,20 limiting ad-
missibility of evidence on behalf of defendant relative to bad
character and prior acts of misconduct on the part of the victim,2
preclude admissibility of evidence as to a victim's mental state
where factors relevant to the victim's mental state were known to
the defendant and hence bore upon his claimed reasonable fear of
physical danger from the victim? Additionally, does the limiting rule
relative to the character of the victim preclude otherwise admissible
evidence tending to show that the victim was so mentally disturbed
that he was prone to engage in aggressive conduct against the
defendant, whether or not such purported mental state was known
to the defendant? Over a vigorous dissenting opinion authored by
19. In the opinion of the writers, the testimony was technically logically relevant
even on the issue of guilt or innocence, but its probative value was outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. See FED. R. EvID. 401-03; Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A
Conflict in Theory, VAND. L. REV. 385 (1952).
20. LA. R.S. 15:482 (Supp. 1952) provides: "In the absence of evidence of hostile
demonstration or of overt act on the part of the person slain or injured, evidence of his
dangerous character or of his threats against accused is not admissible."
21. See State v. Boss, 353 So. 2d 241 (La. 1977), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-Evidence, 39 LA. L. REV. 955
(1979) [hereinafter cited as 1977-1978 Term]; State v. Lee, 331 So. 2d 455 (La. 1976),
discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976
Term-Evidence, 37 LA. L. REV. 575 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1975-1976 Term],
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 68 (Supp. 1978); and discussed in Note,
Character and Prior Conduct of the Victim in Support of a Plea of Self-Defense, 37
LA. L. REV. 1166 (1977), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 68 (Supp. 1978).
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Justice Tate and concurred in by Justice Calogero, language by the
court in State v. Gomez2" suggests an affirmative answer to both
questions.
In the opinion of the writers, the evidentiary rules limiting ad-
missibility of evidence relative to the bad character of the victim
and wrongful acts committed by him are but part of general rules
regulating the admissibility of evidence particularly susceptible of
being mishandled by the jury. In this area the law is especially con-
cerned with the risk of undue prejudice to the prosecution -that if
the jury learns of a criminal victim's unsavory past, it may be dis-
inclined to give the defendant the punishment he justly deserves.
Categorical rules concerning the risk of undue prejudice are difficult
to formulate and apply, and Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:482 has
given much trouble in that respect. 8 It is submitted that, properly con-
strued, the statutory provision should not be interpreted as covering
evidence of a victim's mental state and that it is better to approach
such evidence as to the victim as falling outside the scope of section
482 and to treat it in the traditional mode, ie., balancing probative
value against the risk of undue prejudice. In the case under discus-
sion, it seems that the evidence was sufficiently relevant and non-
prejudicial to merit admissibility. If, as apparently contended, the
defendant reasonably believed that the victim was mentally derang-
ed, this would have real significance in determining whether he
reasonably apprehended serious physical harm when the victim ac-
costed him.
Character of Victim-Sexual History of Victim
of Alleged Rape
In an excellent concurring opinion in State v. Decuir,2" Justice
Dennis recognized that in a different context Louisiana's broadly
phrased rape shield statute 5 may meet serious constitutional objec-
tions." As all of the justices agreed, however, the trial court in
Decuir was clearly correct in blocking defendant's questions as to
the complainant's sexual history. As pointed out by Justice Marcus
22. 365 So. 2d 1313 (La. 1978).
23. See authorities cited in note 21, supra.
24. 364 So. 2d 946, 948 (La. 1978) (Dennis, J., concurring).
25. LA. R.S. 15:498 (Supp. 1975). See 1977-1978 Term, supra note 21, at 956. For an
able topic note in a recent issue of this Review, see Note, Louisiana's Protection for
Rape Victims: Too Much of a Good Thing? 40 LA. L. REV.. 268 (1979).
26. For an excellent article, see Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A
Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1978). See also
Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 159 (1974); 1977-1978
Term, supra note 21, at 956.
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in the court's opinion, the incident inquired into did not tend to
show bias, interest, or corruption of the victim, nor did it appear to
have any other special particularized relevance.
EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION
OF WITNESSES
Questioning of Witnesses by the Judge
In 1975 the Louisiana Supreme Court seemed to reflect a
positive attitude toward judicial questioning of witnesses under cer-
tain circumstances.27 The court recognized, however, that in a
criminal jury trial, because of Louisiana's rule against judicial com-
ment on the evidence, a judge ought not by his questioning to
reflect his opinion as to the facts.28 This position accords with what
appears to be the majority American view.' The Federal Rules of
Evidence also assume an approving attitude toward such question-
ing.s
o
The propriety of judicial questioning of witnesses was again
before the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1978. In State v. Wagster,
31
although the interrogation of witnesses which had been conducted
by the trial court was not condemned, the majority of the supreme
court used very strong language in expressing its lack of enthusiasm
for judicial questioning of witnesses. It stated: "Although it may be
different in a trial by judge alone, questioning of witnesses in a
criminal jury trial by the judge is a practice to be avoided unless
deemed indispensable to a fair and impartial trial.""2 It went on to
maintain that
27. See State v. Groves, 311 So. 2d 230 (La. 1975), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651, 658
(1976) [hereinafter cited as 1974-1975 Term], reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at
157 (Supp. 1978); and discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1974-1975 Term-Criminal Trial Procedure, 36 LA. L. REV. 605, 624 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Criminal Trial Procedure], reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 158 (Supp.
1978); State v. Layssard, 310 So. 2d 107 (La. 1975), discussed in Criminal Trial Pro-
cedure, supra, at 624, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 158 (Supp. 1978).
28. See State v. Layssard, 310 So. 2d 107 (La. 1975).
29. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 8, at 12 (Cleary ed. 1972).
30. FED. R. EvID. 614 provides in pertinent part:
Calling and interrogation of witnesses by court.-(a) Calling by Court.-The
court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and
all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus called.
(b) Interrogation by Court.-The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called
by itself or by a party.
Federal courts, however, do not prohibit the judge from commenting on the facts. See
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 8, at 13.
31. 361 So. 2d 849 (La. 1978).
32. Id. at 856 (citation omitted).
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[a] judge should be constantly aware of the basic premise of a
criminal trial which calls upon the State, not the judge, to prove
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is enough for
the judge to impartially and wisely regulate the conduct of the
trial without participating in the interrogation of witnesses, a
practice fraught with danger of prejudice to the defendant.3
In the opinion of the writers, the earlier, more hospitable attitude
toward judicial questioning seems preferable."
Credibility- Witness's Evaluation of Credibility
of Out-of-Court Declaration
In State v. Moses" the supreme court held that an experienced
police officer could properly testify, over objection, as to his evalua-
tion of the attitude, sincerity, and credibility of a witness at the
time he made an out-of-court prior inconsistent statement. The ap-
parent purpose of the line of questioning was to show that, at the
time the state's witness had made the prior inconsistent statement,
he was telling the truth and, hence, that his version on the stand was
inaccurate. In a vigorous concurring opinion, Justice Tate protested
the court's holding, but concluded that under the circumstances the
trial court's action was not reversible error. Justice Tate stated that
a witness "cannot testify (based solely on his impression) to his
evaluation of the subjective motive or credibility of another witness
who performed an act or made a statement."36
In the opinion of the writers, Justice Tate's quoted language is a
proper statement of the traditional Louisiana view.37 Further, we
feel it unwise to permit the prosecution, via such testimony from a
police officer, to support the believability of an out-of-court prior in-
consistent statement by the prosecution's own witness. As Justice
Tate pointed out, the legitimate relevance of the witness's out-of-
court utterance under Louisiana law is merely to neutralize or tear
down the testimony given on the stand, not to establish its underly-
ing truth. Credibility of a witness is peculiarly a jury question, and a
33. Id. To be contrasted with Wagster is State v. Nicholas, 359 So. 2d 965 (La.
1978), which cites and quotes Professor McCormick and seems to take a more approv-
ing attitude toward judicial questioning of witnesses.
34. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 8, at 12; 1974-1975 Term, supra note 27,
at 658, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 157 (Supp. 1978).
35. 367 So. 2d 800 (La. 1979).
36. 367 So. 2d at 807 (Tate, J., concurring).
37. See State v. George, 346 So. 2d 694, 702 (La. 1977) (citing by the court). See
also LA. R.S. 15:479, 483 & 491 (1950); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1967-1968 Term-Evidence, 29 LA. L. REV. 310, 316 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
1967-1968 Term], reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 23 (1974).
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jury is not particularly helped by receiving testimony that at the
time the witness made an earlier statement he was, or was not, tell-
ing the truth.
ATTACKING CREDIBILITY
Bias, Interest, Corruption-Plea Bargaining Arrangement
May a defendant call the district attorney as a witness to im-
peach a state's witness (an admitted accomplice) who has denied
receiving any favorable treatment from the prosecution? Although
reversing on other grounds, a majority of the court stated in dictum
in State v. Franks38 that he may, and the writers fully agree. 9
Otherwise, the defendant might well be denied his constitutional
right of confrontation. 0
Bias, Interest, Corruption-Fact of Arrest and Release of State's
Witness as "Brady" Information
In a well-reasoned opinion by Chief Justice Summers, a unani-
mous court"' in State v. Bailey'2 held that defendant was entitled
to a new trial where, despite his Brady'8 request, the prosecution
had failed to inform him that, a short time before defendant's trial
for first degree murder, the state's star witness had been arrested
and thereafter released from jail without bond under circumstances
that may well have resulted in the witness's believing that if he
testified favorably to the prosecution at defendant's trial, pending
charges against him (the witness) would be dropped. Extensively
reviewing state and federal authorities, the decision demonstrates
the wide protection Louisiana law now affords a defendant in this
area. Since the fact of arrest and release had independent relevance
to show bias under Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:492," reasoned
38. 363 So. 2d 518 (La. 1978).
39. See State v. McCord, 340 So. 2d 317 (La. 1976) (indicating that member of pro-
secutorial staff is not incompetent as a witness, but under certain circumstances is sub-
ject to recusation). See also State v. Donahue, 315 So. 2d 329 (La. 1975).
40. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Evidence, 38 LA. L. REV. 567, 576 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as 1976-1977 Term]; 1975-1976 Term, supra note 21, at 586, reprinted in G. PUGH.
supra note 10, at 165 (Supp. 1978).
41. Justice Blanche, however, did not participate.
42. 367 So. 2d 368 (La. 1979).
43. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (right of defendant to prosecutorial
disclosure of evidence favorable to the defendant).
44. See State v. Robinson, 337 So. 2d 1168 (La. 1976) (cited by the court), discuss-
ed in 1976-1977 Term, supra note 40, at 577; Comment, Admissibility of Evidence of
Prior Arrests in Louisiana Criminal Trials, 19 LA. L. REV. 684 (1959), reprinted in G.
PUGH, supra note 10, at 53 (1974).
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the court, the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:495,"
would not have precluded its use at trial to impeach the credibility
of the witness.
Conviction Record of Absent Declarant
When an out-of-court declaration by an absent declarant is held
admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule, may the opposing
party nonetheless attack the credibility of the declarant by the
means traditionally available to attack the credibility of a witness?
Federal Rule of Evidence 806 takes the position that he should, and
the writers agree.
The problem was encountered this past year by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in a paradoxical context. In State v. Henderson" an
out-of-court statement by the victim of a homicide was held admissi-
ble as an excited utterance. Defense counsel had sought to attack
the declarant's credibility by showing that she had been convicted of
crime, and had sought to force the prosecution to produce the vic-
tim's criminal record. In an opinion authored by Justice Dennis, a
majority of the supreme court took the position that if in fact the
declarant-victim had been convicted of crime, defendant should have
been able to show same to attack her credibility. Further, the court
held that the prosecution should have been forced to
respond to the specific request of the defense by stating
whether the State had knowledge or possession of any record of
convictions of the victim, and, if so .... to furnish them to defen-
dant or submit them to the court for a determination as to
whether the defendant was entitled to this material.'7
Since the theory underlying the admissibility of declarations found
to be admissible as excited utterances is that the declarant did
not have sufficient time to fabricate, it may seem inconsistent
to say that the credibility of such declarant can be attacked in
the manner ordinarily available to attack the credibility of a wit-
ness. In the opinion of the writers, however, the position taken in
Henderson is correct. Even as to declarations admissible as 'excited
45. LA. R.S. 15:495 (Supp. 1952) provides:
Evidence of conviction of crime, but not of arrest, indictment or prosecution, is
admissible for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness, but before
evidence of such former conviction can be adduced from any other source than the
witness whose credibility is to be impeached, he must have been questioned on
cross-examination as to such conviction, and have failed distinctly to admit the
same; and no witness, whether he be defendant or not, can be asked on cross-
examination whether or not he has ever been indicted or arrested, and can only
be questioned as to conviction, and as provided herein.
46. 362 So. 2d 1358 (La. 1978).
47. Id. at 1363.
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utterances, the law in its wisdom must realistically recognize that,
as to some such declarations, the declarant may have in fact been af-
fected by traditional biases and motives for fabrication. To protect a
defendant's right of confrontation, he should be permitted to attack
the credibility of the out-of-court declarant even where such
credibility is supported by the factors that underlie the creation and
recognition of the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.
Presumably, attacking the credibility of an out-of-court declarant
constitutes an exception to traditional rules which require that a
foundation be laid so that the subject of the credibility attack has
the opportunity to "explain away" the factors underlying the
attack. 8 Henderson is explored at length in a student casenote in a
recent issue of this Review.4
9
Use of Alcohol-Habitual Intemperance
In attacking an opponent's witness's credibility, a party should
be able to show (both intrinsically and extrinsically) that, at the par-
ticular time in question, the witness was under the influence of
drugs or alcohol - for this is testimony directly bearing upon the
witness's condition at the time he allegedly perceived the facts be-
ing inquired into. 0 May the witness's condition at the time involved
be evidenced by showing that he has a drinking or drug habit? The
court in State v. Landry51 indicated the contrary, and these writers
fully agree.2 Justice Dixon, speaking for the court, stated:
The witness was properly interrogated as to the amount of
alcohol he had consumed on the night of the offense and the ef-
fect it had upon him.
Evidence of habitual intemperance, however, should not be
admissible because, in most cases, it bears little relevance to the
credibility of the witness and falls within the proscription of R.S.
48. See State v. Reed, 290 So. 2d 835 (La. 1974), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525, 535
(1975) [hereinafter cited as 1973-1974 Term], reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at
163 (Supp. 1978). In Reed it is said that there is no exception to Revised Statutes
15:493's requirement that, prior to introducing evidence of a prior inconsistent state-
ment, the witness must first be given the opportunity to explain away the contradic-
tion.
49. Note, Impeaching the Deceased Excited Utterance Declarant, 39 LA. L. REV.
1201 (1979).
50. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 45, at 94. See also State v. Luckett, 327
So. 2d 365 (La. 1976), discussed in 1975-1976 Term, supra note 21, at 585, reprinted in
G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 176 (Supp. 1978) (involving an intrinsic attack).
51. 359 So. 2d 99 (La. 1978).
52. See also the position taken in rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
limiting the use of character evidence.
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15:491 against impeachment of the general credibility through
particular acts and vices."3
Civil Cases-A Witness's Specific Acts of Immorality to Impeach
To what extent may a witness's credibility be attacked by
evidence (intrinsic or extrinsic) of particular acts of immorality? In
Beck v. Lovell '" Judge Landry, speaking for a unanimous panel of
the First Circuit Court of Appeal, stated that the rule applicable in
criminal cases in this regard is likewise applicable in civil
cases-that such evidence is inadmissible.55 In Beck the court found
that the matter was of such importance that it might well have af-
fected the verdict of the jury and, hence, concluded that because of
the trial court error the jury verdict should be denied the force that
otherwise would be accorded it by the manifest error rule."
Religious and Political Beliefs
In State v. Duke,7 a jury trial, a unanimous supreme court held
that it was reversible error for the trial court, for purposes of im-
peachment, to. permit cross-examination of defense witnesses
relative to their religious and political beliefs and their attitudes
toward social issues. The writers agree. Such matters fall beyond
the pale of proper cross-examination.
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Admissibility of Polygraph "Lie Detector" Test re Credibility
The admissibility of the results of polygraph "lie detector" tests
was explored in depth in the very important case of State v.
Catanese.8 In a splendid, scholarly plurality opinion for three
members of the court, Justice Dennis exhaustively surveyed the
jurisprudence and literature on the subject. First, the opinion re-
jects the "general acceptance" test as an overly stringent standard
for admissibility. 9 It goes on to conclude, however, that "at
53. 359 So. 2d at 102.
54. 361 So. 2d 245 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
55. See also Gordon v. City of New Orleans, 363 So. 2d 235 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1978).
56. For a discussion of the action that should be followed by the appellate court
when the trial court has committed consequential error, see text at notes 85-89, infra.
57. 362 So. 2d 559 (La. 1978).
58. 368 So. 2d 975 (La. 1979).
59. Id. at 980. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The court in
Frye stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the ex-
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present," where the introduction of the evidence is opposed by the
prosecution, the test results should be held inadmissible at trial,
because in this context the probative value of such evidence is
outweighed by the risks and dangers involved. 0 In reaching this con-
clusion, the opinion pinpoints three major concerns: (1) the trier
of fact is likely to give such evidence too much weight, (2) a suffi-
cient number of qualified examiners is not available in Louisiana,
and (3) adequate safeguards for admissibility have not yet been
evolved and the court at the present time lacks sufficient experience
to fashion and establish such safeguards. It is clear, however, that
those subscribing to Justice Dennis's opinion feel that the dangers
involved in admitting polygraph evidence are far less severe in some
non-trial proceedings; the opinion expressly states that "[h]ad the ques-
tion arisen in connection with a post trial proceeding we would not
hesitate to affirm""1 the decision of the trial court to admit such
evidence. In a separate opinion, 2 Justice Tate objected to the per se
trial exclusion rule and, in addition, indicated he felt that with proper
safeguards the results of lie detector tests should be admissible in
certain pretrial proceedings (e.g., on motions to suppress). Thus,
four of the six members of the court sitting in the Catanese case 3
would, under appropriate circumstances, approve the admission of
the results of lie detector tests on a motion for new trial.
In the opinion of the writers, the position taken by the court in
Catanese is sound. There is far less danger involved in receiving the
results of polygraph tests in a post-trial motion for a new trial than
in admitting it at the trial itself.
In State ex reL Fields v. Maggio,"' which was decided the same
day as Catanese, Justice Dixon, speaking for a unanimous court, said
perimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.
Id. at 1014.
60. Since the results of lie detector tests are held inadmissible at trial, a witness's
offer to take the test or a refusal to take same is likewise deemed inadmissible. See
State ex rel. Fields v. Maggio, 368 So. 2d 1016 (La. 1979); State v. Drew, 360 So. 2d 500
(La. 1978); State v. Refuge, 264 La. 135, 270 So. 2d 842 (1972), discussed in 1972-1973
Term, supra note 10, at 448, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 126 (Supp. 1978).
61. 368 So. 2d at 983.
62. 368 So. 2d at 983 (Tate, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
63. The seventh member of the court, Justice Blanche, did not participate.
64. 368 So. 2d 1016 (La. 1979).
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in dictum (referring to the admission of polygraph evidence at trial):
"[T]he trial court has the discretion to rule the results inadmissi-
ble even if the defense and prosecution have stipulated their
admission." 5 There seems to be an implication that the trial court in
its discretion, on stipulation of the parties, may admit such evidence
even at trial.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has shown a readiness to utilize
the results of advanced technology, provided it finds the risks do
not overbalance the probative value. Varying aspects of the problem
will continue to come before the court, and it will be most in-
teresting to watch the results of the newly adopted balancing test in
differing contexts. What, for example, will the court now do as to
the results of polygraph tests in civil cases, jury and non-jury?6
OPINION
Medical History-Basis for Expert Opinion
The court in State v. Andrews 7 stated that although statements
by a patient to a physician as to his medical history are not admissi-
ble to prove the truth of their contents, 8 a psychologist, as well as a
physician, testifying as an expert, may properly, in order to show
the basis for his opinion, relate the medical history told him." Under
the circumstances presented in Andrews, the court found, however,
that the trial court error in excluding the evidence did not
necessitate reversal. This rem ipsam rule"6 provides a handy
passkey to get otherwise inadmissible information before the trier
of fact.
65. Id. at 1022. In this connection the court cited State v. Corbin, 285 So. 2d 234
(La. 1973), discussed in 1973-1974 Term, supra note 48, at 537, reprinted in G. PUGH,
supra note 10, at 125 (Supp. 1978).
66. See 1975-1976 Term, supra note 21, at 575, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note
10, at 1 (Supp. 1978).
67. 369 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1979).
68. In some jurisdictions and under rule 803(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
medical history under prescribed conditions is admissible as an exception to the hear-
say rule. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 292, at 690.
69. The court cited and relied on State v. Watley, 301 So. 2d 332 (La. 1974),
discussed in 1974-1975 Term, supra note 27, at 665, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note
10, at 196 (Supp. 1978). See also State v. Fallon, 290 So. 2d 273 (La. 1974); State v.
Austin, 282 So. 2d 711 (La. 1973), discussed in 1973-1974 Term, supra note 48, at 540,
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 196 (Supp. 1978). The court in Andrews stated
in a footnote that there is some disagreement as to the applicability of this rule where
the expert is employed in anticipation of litigation. 369 So. 2d at 1051 n.l.
70. See Marler v. Texas & P. R. Co., 52 La. Ann. 727, 27 So. 176 (1900).
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PRIVILEGE
Physician-Patient Privilege -Availability of Privilege When Accused
Pleads Insanity
Louisiana provides for a very broad physician-patient privilege.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:476 stipulates that, except as to "any
physician, who, under the appointment of the court, and not by a
selection of the patient, has made investigation into the patient's
physical or mental condition" and as to cross-examination of a physi-
cian regarding the correctness of certificates issued by him, "[n]o
physician is permitted .... unless with his patient's express consent,
to disclose any communication made to him as such physician by or
on behalf of his patient, . . . or any information that he may have
gotten by reason of his being such physician." In 1975 in State v.
Berry71 a unanimous court concluded that, despite the broad
language of the statute,
[b]y tendering his mental condition to the jury, [defendant]
waived his right to claim the privilege as to other psychiatric
medical evidence relevant to determination of the issue, such as
(in this instance) prior medical examination and diagnosis as to
the mental condition he now claims exonerates him from
criminal responsibility.72
The problem was revisited and reconsidered in two cases decid-
ed during the past year.3 In State v. Aucoin,7' a first degree murder
case, the state in rebuttal called defendant's private physician (a
psychiatrist) to the stand. Over defendant's claimer of privilege, the
psychiatrist was permitted to testify that, in his opinion, defendant
was sane and to reveal the results of psychological tests ad-
ministered to defendant by him. The court said that a "difficult"
question of statutory construction was involved and that, "indeed,
the statute seems to require the 'express' (not implied) waiver of the
privilege by the patient.""' Nonetheless, the majority of the court,
relying in part on Professor Wigmore, held that, because of defen-
dant's insanity plea, she could not avail herself of the statute to
preclude admissibility. The court said that although commentators
sometimes spoke of the privilege as having been waived in such cir-
cumstances, a better analysis would be to say that, as a matter of
71. 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975), discussed in 1975-1976 Term, supra note 21, at 595,
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 239 (Supp. 1978).
72. 324 So. 2d at 827-28.
73. State v. English, 367 So. 2d 815 (La. 1979); State v. Aucoin, 362 So. 2d 503 (La.
1978).
74. 362 So. 2d 503 (La. 1978).
75. Id. at 505 (emphasis in original).
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statutory interpretation, the privilege was in this context inap-
plicable and unavailable. Said the majority, "[tihis restriction or non-
application of the privilege is implied as intended by reason of its
purposes.""
With deference, it is submitted that, in light of the express
language of Louisiana's statute and the broad and explicit scope of
the privilege created by the legislature, the limiting interpretation
thus given it by the court-however desirable as a matter of
policy-seems unwarranted from the standpoint of statutory inter-
pretation. The court in Aucoin made clear, however, that its holding
as to the non-availability of the privilege in the insanity plea context
is not to be interpreted as meaning that all matters relevant to guilt
or innocence related to a physician by the defendant are to be non-
privileged and admissible if defendant enters an insanity defense.
Appropriately, the majority in Aucoin expressly restricted the non-
availability of the privilege to matters relevant to the "narrow
issue" of insanity. And yet further limiting its holding, the majority
stated:
The trial judge also has a responsibility to weigh the prejudicial
effect of such relevant information against its probative value.
Factors to be considered in this balancing process include the
threat that disclosure of certain confidences, although relevant
and not privileged, would undermine the psychiatrist-patient
relationship by creating a widespread public impression that the
privilege is ineffectual; the possibility that certain evidence rele-
vant to sanity might damage the defendant by its relevance to
other aspects of the case; the remoteness of the psychiatrist's
examination from the time of the commission of the crime; and
the possibility that certain disclosures might encourage the jury
to convict the defendant because he is a bad or dangerous man,
irrespective of his guilt or innocence of the crime charged.77
Demonstrating the restriction in Aucoin, the later case of State v.
English"' held that defendant's admission to a physician that he had
been convicted of an extraneous crime was subject to the privilege."
Identity of Informer
In what is perhaps a very important case, the supreme court in
State v. Theriot" granted a writ and ordered the trial court to re-
76. Id. at 506.
77. Id.
78. 367 So. 2d 815 (La. 1979).
79. Because of the peculiar context, the conviction would apparently have been
held relevant and admissible if not subject to a valid claim of privilege.
80. 369 So. 2d 708 (La. 1979).
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quire the prosecution to disclose the identity of the alleged informer
in a drug case. The supreme court did not write a formal opinion;
Justice Dixon's concurring opinion alone provides insight into the
court's reasoning.
According to the concurring opinion, defendants had been ar-
rested seven months after the alleged drug sale. The state maintain-
ed that Deputy Breaux had gone to defendants' house with an in-
former identified only by the name "Art," and there purchased il-
legal drugs from the defendants. Defendants contended that Breaux
had not gone to their house and maintained that "Art," whoever he
was, was a material witness. They had been, however, unsuccessful
in their attempt in the trial court to force the prosecution to iden-
tify "Art." Using strong language, Justice Dixon observed:
The allegation is made that this was a case of entrapment,
but there is little argument to support that defense. However,
no reason is suggested why the witness to the transaction
should not be subject to summons by the defense. The defense is
entitled to the benefit of Art's knowledge and the state has no
right to hide the identity of the witness. 1
Justice Dixon apparently feels that, if defendant makes out a prima
facie case that the state's unidentified informer is a material
witness, defendant has the right to secure the informer's identity,
unless the state can establish sufficient reason to deny the request.
This seems to be a much more liberal attitude than that reflected by
the majority opinion on rehearing in State v. Dotson.2
COMPETENCY
Juror's Competency as Witness in Attack Upon Verdict
In very sweeping language, Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:470
states:
No juror, grand or petit, is competent to testify to his own
or his fellows' misconduct, or to give evidence to explain, qualify
or impeach any indictment or any verdict found by the body of
which he is or was a member; but every juror, grand or petit, is
a competent witness to rebut any attack upon the regularity of
the conduct or of the findings of the body of which he is or was
a member.
81. Id. at 708-09.
82. 260 La. 471, 256 So. 2d 594 (1971) (on rehearing), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Evidence, 33 LA. L. REV. 306, 313
(1973) [hereinafter cited as 1971-1972 Term], reprinted in G. PUGH. supra note 10, at
187 (1974).
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Does this mean that a juror is absolutely incompetent to give
testimony that, if believed, would precipitate setting aside the jury
verdict? In 1977 in State v. Durr" the majority of the court, in a
four-to-three decision, held that, due to Louisiana Revised Statute
15:470, a juror was incompetent to testify that outside the presence
of the jury he had conducted a reenactment of the crime and had
related the results of his experiment to his fellow jurors.
This past year the problem of juror incompetency was again
before the court. In State v. Marchand" defendant sought to show
by the testimony of two jurors that, in response to their request to
peruse defendant's confession, the bailiff, in violation of the judge's
instructions, had told them that "[tihe district attorney said it was
okay, the judge said it was alright, but the defense attorney said
definitely not; couldn't have it.""6 Relying in part on the 1937 case of
State v. Kifer,8 which had approved a grand juror's testifying as to
the presence of the district attorney during grand jury delibera-
tions, the majority of the court in Marchard, also in a four-to-three
decision, held that the jurors could properly so testify. In so holding,
the court distinguished the Durr case on the grounds that Durr con-
cerned improper action by a member of the jury itself. The majority
in Marchand, in an opinion authored by Justice Tate, concluded that
the legislative prohibition does not preclude juror testimony with
respect to "the overt act of a third person which caused extraneous
prejudicial information to be considered by the jury in reaching its
verdict."87 Thus, the line drawn by the Durr and Marchand cases ap-
pears to be whether or not the conduct testified to by the juror
relates to improper practices of extraneous third persons.
It is the opinion of the writers that in light of recent
developments relative to defendant's rights of confrontation88 and
compulsory process, 9 it would be more desirable for the law to at-
83. 343 So. 2d 1004 (La. 1977), discussed in 1976-1977 Term, supra note 40, at 581.
84. 362 So. 2d 1090 (La. 1978).
85. Id. at 1092. As to the non-availability of written evidence to the jury during
its deliberation, see LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 793; State v. Freetime, 303 So. 2d 487 (La.
1974), discussed in Criminal Trial Procedure, supra note 27, at 616, reprinted in G.
PUGH, supra note 10, at 607 (Supp. 1978).
For leading United States Supreme Court cases regarding allegations of bailiff
misconduct, see Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
466 (1965).
86. 186 La. 674, 173 So. 169 (1937).
87. 362 So. 2d at 1093. For a later case re juror's testimony as to the arrest of a
witness in their presence, their relating same to other jurors, etc., see State v.
Wisham, 371 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1979).
88. See authorities collected in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 526-27 (Supp. 1978).
89. See authorities collected in id. at 447-52.
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tack the problem faced in Durr and Marchand by substantive rules
rather than rules of competency or privilege. After Davis v. Alaska"'
and Chambers v. Mississippi,1 it is very suspect to say, 2 as does
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:470, that a juror is competent to
rebut attacks upon the regularity of the jury's proceedings, but not
competent to support the attack. If the statutory provision be taken
totally at face value, and members of a jury were equally divided as
to a particular factual allegation of impropriety (for example, an im-
proper remark to all twelve jurors by the bailiff), the six jurors will-
ing to testify that the improper act occurred would be deemed in-
competent, whereas those willing to testify to the opposite would be
considered competent. This seems clearly in derogation of the prin-
ciples underlying Chambers and the right of compulsory process.
The real issue, it is submitted, is a substative one, ie., what conduct
by which persons should be deemed so grave as to vitiate a jury
verdict in a criminal case.
Competency-Declarations of Parent Bastardizing Child
In Boudreaux v. Matt" plaintiff, claiming that he was the
biological father of three children, brought an action against the
mother of the children seeking to be granted custodial and visitation
rights. In her original answer to plaintiff's petition, defendant
mother conceded that all three children were born as a result of her
cohabitation with the plaintiff. Thereafter, however, with the ap-
proval of the court, defendant amended her answer to deny that the
eldest child, who it appears was born prior to the time defendant
was judicially separated from her then husband, was the child of the
plaintiff. It was conceded that the two younger children were the
children of the plaintiff and he was given visitation rights as to
them by the trial court. The trial court held that there was a failure
of proof as to the parentage of the third child. Relying on the tradi-
tional rule against parents' bastardizing their children, the court of
appeal affirmed, upholding the trial court's exclusion of testimony
by the plaintiff that defendant had told him that he was the father
of the eldest child.
90. 415 U.S. 308 (1974), discussed in 1975-1976 Term, supra note 21, at 586,
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 165 (Supp. 1978); and discussed in 1973-1974
Term, supra note 48, at 538, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 168 (Supp. 1978).
91. 410 U.S. 284 (1973), discussed in 1973-1974 Term, supra note 48, at 544,
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 154 (Supp. 1978).
92. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); United States ex rel DeLucia v.
MeMann, 373 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1967); People v. DeLucia, 20 N.Y.2d 275, 229 N.E.2d 211
(1967); ABA STANDARDS, TRIAL BY JURY §§ 164-65.
93. 370 So. 2d 139 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
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With deference, it is submitted that Louisiana's evidentiary
rules in this area regarding the admissibility of testimony as to
children's biological parents should be reconsidered and reevaluated.
The common law counterpart to Louisiana's rule has been scathingly
criticized by Dean Wigmore,9 and the social and legal status of
children born of irregular relationships has been greatly improved."5
For example, a child born during the period of the marriage of his
mother to her husband is now entitled to claim in the succession of
his biological father. 6 Similarly, such a child may have a wrongful
death claim for the death of his biological father."
If, in Boudreaux, plaintiff was the biological father, as conceded
originally by the mother, it may well have been in the interest of
the child for plaintiff to have been given custodial and/or visitation
rights. If there is a substantive right to visitation, its successful
assertion should not be thwarted by evidentiary rules precluding ad-
missibility of reliable, trustworthy evidence from persons in the
best position to know the true facts. Just as the substantive rules of




A very nice illustration of a non-hearsay use of an out-of-court
declaration is State v. Ford."9 Defendant sought to justify his act of
shooting the victim by a claim that he acted in self-defense. After
testimony by defendant that the victim had advanced on him with a
pocket knife, to buttress his claim of self-defense, defendant sought
to testify that he had been told by a friend that the victim had said
he would kill him. The trial court excluded defendant's testimony on
the ground that the reality of the threat, if it existed, would have to
be testified to by the friend who, according to defendant, purported
to have heard it uttered by the victim. In a very well-reasoned opin-
ion authored by Justice Calogero, the supreme court reversed defen-
dant's conviction. The fact of the threat was not at issue, reasoned
the court; instead, the question was whether in fact defendant had
94. See J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2063 (Chadbourn rev. 1978).
95. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 763 (1977); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535
(1973); Succession of Mitchell, 323 So. 2d 451 (La. 1975); Warren v. Richard, 296 So. 2d
813 (La. 1974); Spaht & Shaw, The Strongest Presumption Challenged Speculations on
Warren v. Richard and Succession of Mitchell, 37 LA. L. REV. 59 (1976).
96. Succession of Mitchell, 323 So. 2d 451 (La. 1975).
97. Warren v. Richard, 296 So. 2d 813 (La. 1974).
98. 368 So. 2d 1074 (La. 1979).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
been told of such a threat as bearing on his state of mind, and, of
course, defendant was a proper witness as to whether he had or had
not been so told. The writers fully agree. Because of defendant's ob-
vious bias, the purported friend would have been a better, more
credible witness to the claimed communication to the defendant, but
both were competent to testify to it.
Hearsay vs. Non-Hearsay- Witness's Prior Statement
Is a witness's testimony to his own out-of-court written or oral
statement subject to a hearsay objection? In State v. Martin," a
1978 case, Justice Dennis in an excellent opinion for the majority1"
stated that, although there had been sporadic indications to the con-
trary, a witness's prior statement (in that case, a prior letter writ-
ten by the defendant-witness to his lawyer) is indeed subject to a
hearsay objection. In so holding, the court adopted Professor McCor-
mick's splendid definition of hearsay:
Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written evidence,
of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as
an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and
thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court
asserter.' 0'
The position taken by the court in Martin accords with prior
holdings by the Louisiana Supreme Court"°2 and with the view
generally taken by Congress in its adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.'" In addition, it accords with the traditional American
99. 356 So. 2d 1370 (La. 1978), discussed in 1977-1978, supra note 21, at 988.
100. Although three justices of the court did not join in the opinion authored by
Justice Dennis (two were listed as dissenting, and one as concurring in part and
dissenting in part), none expressed disagreement with this aspect of the court's
holding.
101. 356 So. 2d at 1373, quoting C. MCCORMICK, supra note 29,/§ 246.
102. See State v. Ford, 336 So. 2d 817 (La. 1976), discussed i, 1976-1977 Term,
supra note 40, at 582; State v. Williams, 331 So. 2d 467 (La. 1,976), discussed in
1975-1976 Term, supra note 21, at 609, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 523
(Supp. 1978); State v. Ray, 259 La. 105, 249 So. 2d 540 (1971), discussed in 1971-1972
Term, supra note 82, at 311, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 104 (1974). See
also State v. Fontenot, 48 La. Ann. 283, 19 So. 113 (1896).
103. The Federal Rules of Evidence, however, in its definition of hearsay excludes
(1) Prior statement by witness.-The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement
is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or
(B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C)
one of identification of a person made after perceiving him.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
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view... and with what seems to these writers to be the view implicit
in Louisiana legislation relative to the subject."5
In light of the fact that none of the justices on the court ex-
pressly protested this aspect of the Martin case,0 6 it was thought
that Martin definitively clarified Louisiana's position on the point.0 7
However, in the 1979 decision of State v. Arnold,"8 in an opinion
authored by Justice Ad Hoc Culpepper,"'0 the court harkened back
to dictum definitions given in pre-Martin cases and held that the trial
court did not err in permitting a state's witness, over a hearsay ob-
jection, to read to the jury a written report she had made to the
police, and in thereafter permitting the state to introduce the writ-
ten report itself. Martin was not cited by the court. In able concur-
ring opinions, Justices Dennis and Calogero, citing Martin, protested
the majority's treatment of the problem and contended that the
questioned evidence had been inadmissible.
In the view of the writers, the definition adopted in Martin
represents the better approach.1 In Arnold the witness's prior
statement may have been admissible as corroborative evidence.'
Further, if any error were committed by the trial court in admitting
the questioned evidence, it may well have been non-reversible
error.' The matter is nonetheless significant, both in theory and in
practice. If the approach announced in the majority opinion in Ar-
nold is followed to its logical conclusion, a witness would, over a
hearsay objection, be permitted to read statements given to the
104. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 251 at 601.
105. LA. R.S. 15:484-85, 487-88 & 496-97 (1950). See 1972-1973 Term, supra note 10,
at 454, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 179 (Supp. 1978).
106. See note 100, supra.
107. The definition given in Martin was cited with approval in State v. Ford, 368
So. 2d 1074, 1077 (La. 1979); State v. English, 367 So. 2d 815, 817 (La. 1979); State v.
Arbuthnot, 367 So. 2d 296, 298 (La. 1979); State v. Kirsch, 363 So. 2d 429, 431 (La.
1978); State v. Gibson, 359 So. 2d 147, 148 n.2 (La. 1978); State v. Millet, 356 So. 2d
1380, 1382 (La. 1978).
108. 367 So. 2d 324 (La. 1979).
109. Sitting by special appointment under article V, section 5(A) of the Louisiana
constitution.
110. See authorities cited in note 102, supra.
111. See LA. R.S. 15:496 (1950). Section 496 provides: "When the testimony of a
witness has been assailed as to a particular fact stated by him, similar prior
statements, made at an unsuspicious time, may be received \to corroborate his
testimony." The evidence in question was offered on redirect examination, and on
cross-examination it appears that the witness's testimony in chief may have been
"assailed" on the point. See State v. Arnold, 367 So. 2d at 330 (Calogero, J., concur-
ring).
112. See State v. Arnold, 367 So. 2d at'329 (Dennis, J., concurring); 367 So. 2d at
330 (Calogero, J., concurring); State v. Ford, 336 So. 2d 817 (La. 1976), discussed in
1976-1977 Term, supra note 40, at 582.
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district attorney, to the police, to insurance adjustors, or to defense
counsel. As noted above, in Martin, the court (correctly, we believe)
held that a defendant should not be permitted to get before the jury
a letter written by him to his defense counsel. No more, it is submit-
ted, should the state be permitted to introduce into evidence a
state's witness's prior statement to the police-unless, of course, the
statement under the circumstances is properly admissible as cor-
roborative evidence "8 or otherwise overcomes the hearsay objection.
A contrary rule, it is felt, would open the door to improper, "sharp"
practices in both civil and criminal cases. It is hoped, therefore, that
the court will return to the salutary definition of hearsay as set
forth by Professor McCormick, adopted in Martin in 1978, and since
cited with approval in a number of cases."'
Admissions-Civil Cases-Statements by Attorney in Open Court
as "Judicial Confession"
Civil Code article 2291 provides in part: "The judicial confession
is the declaration which the party, or his special attorney in fact,
makes in a judicial proceeding." The article formerly gave the
courts a great deal of difficulty, but much of the confusion was
eliminated by the supreme court's clarifying decisions in Sanderson
v. Frost"5 and Jackson v. Gulf Insurance Co." 8 Some problems ap-
parently remain, however.
Where counsel of record states in open court that his client's
case has been compromised, is such a statement to be regarded as a
"judicial confession" within the meaning of Civil Code article 2291
(and therefore binding upon his client)-despite the fact that
whatever agreement had been entered into by the attorney with op-
posing party had been done in contravention of express provisions
of the contingent fee contract between the attorney and his client?
It is surprising to these writers that the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peal in Singleton v. Bunge Corp."7 held in the affirmative."8 The
113. See LA. R.S. 15:484-85 & 496-97 (1950).
114. See note 107, supra.
115. 198 La. 295, 3 So. 2d 626 (1941).
116. 250 La. 819, 199 So. 2d 886 (1967), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Ap-
pellate Courts for the 19661967 Term-Evidence, 28 LA. L. REv. 429, 438 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as 1966-1967 Term], reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 438
(1974).
117. 364 So. 2d 1321 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
118. To be contrasted with Singleton is Merriell v. Collins, 218 So. 2d 632 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1969), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1968-1969 Term-Evidence, 30 LA. L. REV. 321, 326 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
1968-1969 Term], reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 437 (1974), relative to the
binding effect of a factual statement in pleadings made by an attorney allegedly
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court said that a party's counsel of record "does not have authority
to settle his client's claim without his client's 'clear and express con-
sent.' Nor, generally, can an attorney sign a binding settlement
agreement on behalf of his client without a written authorization
from the client.'. 19 It held, however, that in the instant case the at-
torney's declaration in open court that his clients had agreed to set-
tle the case for a stipulated sum constituted a "judicial confession"
by the party-litigants' "special attorney in fact," binding upon them
under the provisions of article 2291. The court thus apparently
equated "counsel of record" with the phrase "special attorney in
fact" as used in article 2291.
In the opinion of the writers, such was a misinterpretation of
"special attorney in fact." Present day article 2291 can be traced to
the Louisiana Civil Codes of 180820 and 1825,121 and in turn to article
1356 of the Code Napol6on. "'22 From the French texts of these ar-
ticles, it is clear that the phrase "special attorney in fact" was a
translation of the French phrase "fond6 de pouvoir sp6cial." Perhaps
a better translation of the French would have been "special man-
date."'2 3 The phrase indicates that special authorization is required
for a third person to do the specified act. This accords with the ap-
proach taken in Civil Code article 2997 that a general mandate is in-
sufficient "to compromise" or "to make a transaction in matters of
litigation," -that for these, "express and special" power is required.
In sum, it is submitted that the phrase "special attorney in fact"
does not properly translate to "attorney at law" or "counsel of
record." Although a person's attorney at law in Louisiana does have
certain implied authority, 2' compromising his client's lawsuit is not
within such powers-as the court of appeal in the earlier quoted
part of the opinion properly recognized. Article 2291, it is believed,
was never intended to afford a device to circumvent this rule.
Admissions-Guilty Plea by Party
When civil and crimina' cases both grow out of a traffic acci-
without his client's authorization. For a later case bearing on the binding effect of an
attorney's stipulation, see Eanes v. McKnight, 262 La. 915, 265 So. 2d 220 (1972).
119. 364 So. 2d at 1325 (citations omitted).
120. LA. DIGEST OF 1808, bk. 3, tit. 3, art. 257.
121. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2270 (1825).
122. 1972 COMPLIED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA art. 2291 (J. Dainow
ed.).
123. See FRENCH-ENGLISH AND ENGLISH-FRENCH DICTIONARY OF LEGAL WORDS AND
PHRASES 64 (2d ed. 1951); NOUVEAU DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT ET DE SCIENCES ECONOM-
IQUES 222 (3d ed. 1967).
124. See 1966-1967 Term, supra note 116, at 438, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note
10, at 442 (1974).
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dent, is the fact that the defendant pleaded guilty to the criminal of-
fense admissible against him in the civil proceeding? In Arceneaux
v. Domingue 15 the supreme court succinctly answered in the affirm-
ative.12 In so holding, it accords with Davis v. Bankston,127 an earlier
Third Circuit Court of Appeal case authored by then Judge Tate,
which gave an interesting discussion of the rules applicable. Davis
distinguished a guilty plea (which is normally admissible against the
party litigant who made it as an admission) from a conviction (which,
said the Davis court in dictum, is ordinarily inadmissible hearsay to
prove the underlying facts)." 8 Although Arceneaux speaks of defen-
dant's guilty plea as an "admission against interests,"'" it is submit-
ted that, properly understood, the admissibility of guilty pleas
should be analyzed and treated under the "admission" exception to
the hearsay rule rather than the distinguishable (but sometimes
commingled) "declaration against interest" exception.'"0
Admissions- Criminal Cases-Accused's Silence
Following Miranda Caution
In Doyle v. Ohio' the United States Supreme Court held that a
defendant's silence and non-explanation following a Miranda caution
125. 365 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1979).
126. Difficult questions such as the admissibility in civil cases of unconstitutionally
obtained guilty pleas were not presented to the court or discussed. Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238 (1969). Such cases involve different policy issues than those presented in
Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972) (use in a criminal case of convictions constitutionally
invalid under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), to impeach defendant's
credibility violates defendant's due process rights).
127. 192 So. 2d 614 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966), discussed in 1966-1967 Term, supra note
116, at 436, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 443 (1974).
128. To be contrasted with this aspect of Davis is Breeland v. Security Insurance
Co. of New Haven, Conn., 421 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1969), which discusses Davis and the
confusing Louisiana jurisprudence bearing on the point. See also Welch v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 359 So. 2d 154 (La. 1978), discussed in Comment, Litigation Preclu-
sion in Louisiana: Welch v. Crown Zellerbach and the Death of Collateral Estoppel, 53
TUL. L. REV. 875 (1979); Bankston v. Folks, 38 La. Ann. 267 (1886). Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(22) departs from the traditional rule and authorizes the admission of cer-
tain convictions under an exception to the hearsay rule.
129. 365 So. 2d at 1336.
130. Professor McCormick says:
Of course, most admissions are actually against interest when made, but there
is no such requirement. Hence the common phrase in judicial opinions, "admis-
sions against interest," is an invitation to confuse two separate exceptions to the
hearsay rule and to engraft upon admissions a requirement without basis in
reason or authority.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 262, at 630-31 (footnotes omitted). For a recent case us-
ing an analysis which seems to these writers to confuse the two concepts, see State v.
Lawrence, 365 So. 2d 1356 (La. 1979).
131. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
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is "insolubly ambiguous""1 2 and that it is improper for the prosecu-
tion to attempt to discredit defendant's testimony at trial by inquir-
ing why he had not given the present explanation to the police
following his arrest.3 ' Despite Doyle and State v. Montoya,"" which
in 1976 applied the Doyle principle, a majority of the Louisiana
Supreme Court held in State v. Procell'" that the prosecution had
not acted improperly in eliciting from police officers in its case in
chief the fact that the defendant had been given the Miranda cau-
tion and had made no statement. The court reasoned that the
testimony was admissible to show the fact that defendant was given
the caution and that defendant had claimed and not waived his
rights. A vigorous and very persuasive dissent was filed by Justice
Calogero, who was joined by Justice Dennis.
In the opinion of the writers, it is extremely difficult to square
the Procell decision with the earlier decisions by the United States
Supreme Court and the Louisiana Supreme Court. So far as the
writers perceive, the fact of the Miranda caution having been given
and the defendant's non-waiver of these rights had no particular
relevance to the state's case other than the prohibited one-i e., the
implication that since defendant had not earlier related his present
exculpatory story to the police, it might well be a fabrication. Loui-
siana has traditionally been very protective of the defendant's right
to silence. ' " It is believed that Procell is a step in the wrong direc-
tion and raises serious questions as to whether defendant Procell
was unconstitutionally convicted.
Confessions-Juvenile Waiver of Right to Counsel and Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination
Especially troublesome problems are presented with respect to
waiver of constitutional rights by a person of immature years. In
the extremely important case of In re Dino,"7 a sharply divided
Louisiana Supreme Court laid down the following absolute rule with
regard to waiver of right to counsel and privilege against self-
incrimination:
132. Id. at 617.
133. See also United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
134. 340 So. 2d 557 (La. 1976).
135. 365 So. 2d 484 (La. 1978).
136. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1964-1965
Term-Evidence, 26 LA. L. REV. 618 (1966), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 327
(1974); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1961-1962
Term-Evidence, 23 LA. L. REV. 412 (1963), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 327
(1974); Note, Admissibility of Silence After Arrest as Implied Admission, 24 LA. L.
REV. 115 (1963), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 323 (1974).
137. 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978).
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[T]he purported waiver by a juvenile must be adjudged inef-
fective upon the failure by the State to establish any of three
prerequisites to waiver, viz., that the juvenile actually consulted
with an attorney or an adult before waiver, that the attorney or
adult consulted was interested in the welfare of the juvenile, or
that, if an adult other than an attorney was consulted, the adult
was fully advised of the rights of the juvenile."8
In so stating, the court expressly relied upon the principles
underlying Miranda v. Arizonas and the broad language of article I,
section 13 of the Louisiana constitution. 0 It will be interesting to
watch whether the rule of Dino will be extended to juvenile waiver
of other constitutional rights, as for example, the right to be pro-
tected against unconstitutional searches and seizures under Loui-
siana constitutional article I, section 5."'
Declarations Against Interest-Penal Interest
Under certain narrowly drawn circumstances, declarations
against interest are admissible as an exception to the hearsay
rule.42 One of the requirements for admissibility is that the
declarant be unavailable at the time of the trial. Traditionally, a
declaration against pecuniary or proprietary interest was also re-
quired; penal interest would not suffice. The rule, however, was
much criticized and to some extent has been relaxed.' 3
Following a national trend, Louisiana in State v. Gilmore,"' a
1976 case, held that under the circumstances there presented, the
confession of an unavailable third person offered by defendant was
admissible. The problem was again before the court in 1978 in State
v. Hudson."' At a second trial for first degree murder, defendant for
the first time offered testimony that his wife had confessed to the
138. Id. at 594. However, in State v. Collum, 365 So. 2d 1272 (La. 1978), with
Justice Calogero providing the "swing" vote, the court held that the Dino rule is to be
given prospective effect only.
139. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
140. Importantly, in this connection the court cited pertinent portions of the
transcript of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention and Hargrave, The Declaration
of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 40-48 (1974).
141. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (adopting a different
standard with respect to federal fourth amendment rights than that mandated in
Miranda regarding fifth and sixth amendment rights).
142. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 276, at 670-71.
143. Id., § 278, at 673-74.
144. 332 So. 2d 789 (La. 1976), discussed in 1975-1976 Term, supra note 21, at 602,
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 535 (Supp. 1978).
145. 361 So. 2d 858 (La. 1978).
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crime. To show unavailability, defendant testified that he had not
seen or heard from his wife since the first trial seven months
before. Stressing that the defendant had not revealed the purported
confession until the second trial, and apparently had made no effort
to secure law enforcement assistance in locating her, ' the court
found that the defendant had failed to make the requisite showing of
"unavailability." In addition, although the court apparently rested
its decision on the failure of the defendant to show genuine
"unavailability" of the out-of-court declarant, it expressed the view
that the circumstances tended to show that the purported confession
was in fact unreliable. Despite the light thrown upon the matter by
the Gilmore and Hudson decisions, the precise contours of the
declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule in
Louisiana state court proceedings must await future decisions or
legislation. This is not surprising, for the area is complex and dif-
ficult.
The writers agree that for an out-of-court declaration against in-
terest to qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule, a persuasive
showing of unavailability of the maker thereof should be made. The
testimony offered in the instant case left much to be desired. In-
terestingly, the Federal Rules of Evidence afford elaborate provi-
sions as to what constitutes unavailability in this context." ' In what
may seem an unduly heavy burden to place upon a defendant, the
federal rules also provide that a declaration against penal interest
offered by the defendant to exculpate himself is inadmissible "unless
146. The court stated in this regard that "it is hardly conceivable that the aid of
law enforcement officials could not have been enlisted to locate one who confessed to
stabbing another to death." Id. at 860.
147. FED. R. EVID. 804(a) provides:
Hearsay exceptions-Declarant unavailable.-(a) Definition of Unavailability.-
"Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant-
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement
despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been
unable to procure his attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under sub-
division (b)(2),(3), or (4), his attendance or testimony) by process or other
reasonable means. A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption,
refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement
or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing
the witness from attending or testifying.
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corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of
the statement."'4 8 Curiously, the rules do not expressly place a
similar burden upon the prosecution.
Dying Declarations -Impact of "Help Me" Statement
An interesting recent "dying declaration" case is State v.
Unger.'9 The supreme court held that the trial court did not err in
admitting testimony by a security supervisor that, via a walkie
talkie radio, he had heard the homicide victim state, "Come back by
Building 8. I have been stabbed and am bleeding to death." The fact
that when the witness reached the victim, the victim said, "Help
me," under the circumstances did not belie the trustworthiness of
the victim's earlier statement indicating that he believed his death
was imminent. The court gave a nice, succinct statement of the dy-
ing declaration exception to the hearsay rule:
Dying declarations are admissible if made when the declarant is
fully conscious of his condition and under a sense of impending
death after having abandoned all hope or expectation of recovery.
... If the declarant believed in his impending death at the time
he made the declaration, it does not matter that thereafter he
believed he would recover, or entertained a momentary hope.",M
Present and Immediately Past Sense Impressions
In 1973 in State v. Smith,' the Louisiana Supreme Court, citing
Professor McCormick and an early draft of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, expressly approved "present sense impression" as an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule and differentiated it from the "excited
utterance" exception."' Both "excited utterance" and "present sense
impression" are often subsumed under the catch-all "res gestae."
.148. FED. R. Evri. 804(b)(3).
149. 362 So. 2d 1095 (La. 1978).
150. Id. at 1098 (citations omitted).
151. 285 So. 2d 240 (La. 1973), discussed in 1973-1974 Term, supra note 48, at 548,
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 545 (Supp. 1978).
152. FED. R. EVID. 803 provides in pertinent part:
Hearsay exceptions-Availability of declarant immaterial.-The following are
not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a
witness:
(1) Present sense impression.-A statement describing or explaining an event or
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or
immediately thereafter.
See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 298 at 709-11; Comment, Excited Utterances and
Present Sense Impressions as Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in Louisiana, 29 LA. L.
REv. 661 (1969), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 494 (1974).
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For verbal statements, the court in Smith seemed to require that
the statement be contemporaneous with the event that was the sub-
ject of the declaration. As to non-verbal statements, however, it said
that "the fact that the statement is made contemporaneously with
the act or immediately thereafter implies reliability since the
declarant is unlikely to have had an opportunity to form a purpose
to mistake his observations.""15
Again, in the 1975 case of State v. Carvin15' the court approved
the admissibility of a contemporaneous sense impression as an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1)
the exception applies to "[a] statement describing or explaining an
event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the
event or condition, or immediately thereafter." Thus under the
federal rules even verbal statements made "immediately" following
the event qualify under the exception.
Assume that an armed robbery occurs in a barroom and a
defense witness testifies that as he (the witness) came out of a
restroom he saw "the robber" leaving the establishment, and that
although he was unable to "discern the man's facial features . . . he
was personally able to determine that the man he saw leaving the
barroom was more darkly complexioned than the defendant.' 55
Should the defense witness, over a prosecutorial hearsay objection,
be permitted also to relate descriptions of the robber given by other
barroom patrons immediately following the robbery in order to
demonstrate that such descriptions did not fit the defendant? This
was the problem presented to the court in State v. Gibson."' Stating
that the testimony did not qualify under the res gestae exception to
the hearsay rule, the court held that the trial court properly sustain-
ed the state's hearsay objection. The court did not discuss Smith or
Carvin or whether the exception recognized in those cases should be
interpreted to authorize admission in the instant case.
It seems to these writers that under the circumstances
presented in Gibson, the out-of-court declarations were sufficiently
reliable to be admitted under the present sense impression excep-
tion to the hearsay rule although admittedly the facts presented in
Gibson go slightly beyond those presented to the court in Smith and
Carvin. Since offered on behalf of the defendant, there is no problem
153. 285 So. 2d at 245.
154. 308 So. 2d 757 (La. 1975), discussed in 1974-1975 Term, supra note 27, at 671,
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 545 (Supp. 1978).
155. State v. Gibson, 359 So. 2d 147, 149 (La. 1978).
156. 359 So. 2d 147 (La. 1978).
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of violating an accused's right of confrontation. To the contrary,
denying an accused the right to introduce such evidence under the
circumstances arguably might impinge upon his right to make out
his defense.157
Alternatively, it is submitted that the robbery was sufficiently
exciting and the time lapse so slight that the declarations of the bar-
room patrons should have been admissible as excited utterances."8
Excited Utterance
In State v. Henderson59 Justice Dennis affords a really splendid
discussion of the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule,
analyzing and balancing the factors that underlie the exception. The
supreme court held that the trial court did not err in admitting
against the defendant an out-of-court declaration by the victim of a
homicide. Because of "the ferocity of the attack" upon the victim
and "the severity of her injuries," ' the court held that the declara-
tions by her identifying the defendant as one of her assailants were
admissible, despite the fact that (1) they were in response to general,
albeit non-suggestive, questions; (2) they included reference to past
facts; (3) they were made as much as fifteen minutes after the
shooting; and (4) the declarant presumably bore strong ill will
against defendant because she believed he had killed her brother."'
Public Documents
In 1978 in State v. Martin'2 a majority of the Louisiana
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Dennis, expressed the
view that, rather than create a general exception for official records,
"[w]hen the legislature has enacted such exceptions it has done so in
express terms. E.g., La.C.Cr.P. art. 105 (coroner's report and proces
verbal of autopsy); La.R.S. 13:3714 (hospital records); La.R.S. 15:529.1
(penitentiary photographs and fingerprint records); cf. Fed.R.Evid.
157. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), discussed in 1973-1974 Term,
supra note 48, at 544, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 154 (Supp. 1978); Westen,
The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 167 (1974).
158. See State v. Smith, 285 So. 2d 240 (La. 1973), discussed in 1973-1974 Term,
supra note 48, at 548, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 545 (Supp. 1978); Com-
ment, supra note 152.
159. 362 So. 2d 1358 (La. 1978).
160. Id. at 1362.
161. The court went on to hold, however, that the trial court erred in rebuffing
defendant's efforts at impeaching declarant. See text at notes 46-49, supra.
162. 356 So. 2d 1370 (La. 1978), discussed in 1977-1978 Tern, supra note 21, at 988.
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803(8), 901."'" 6 Later the same year, however, in State v. Nicholas,"'
over a vigorous, well-reasoned protest by Justice Dennis, the court,
speaking through Justice Tate, gave approval to a limited "public
documents" exception. Emphasizing the narrow character of the
newly recognized exception, the court expressly stated in a most
significant footnote:
In addition to other limitations upon admissibility, however,
the facts recorded must be within the personal knowledge of the
certifying official (or a subordinate of his office) entrusted with
the legal duty to make (and retain) such record, based upon first-
hand knowledge of the fact so recorded. Wigmore, Section 1635;
McCormick, Section 315. Thus, in the present instance, the con-
viction reports on the state police record are a second-hand com-
pilation of data which, when relevant, are provable by official
records of the agency with first-hand knowledge (i.e., the convic-
tion trial court), but not (in the absence of statutory authoriza-
tion) by the present state police document.6 '
It is, of course, to be noted that any such exception cannot abridge
an accused's right of confrontation guaranteed by state and federal
constitutions.'66 It is to be anticipated that further narrowing restric-
tions upon the scope of the exception may be created.'
Necessity-Trustworthiness as Basis for New Exceptions
There has been a discernible tendency throughout the country
to relax the rigors of the hearsay rule where proffered evidence is
both trustworthy and necessary but does not quite fit any of the
traditional exceptions.'" The tendency in Louisiana is perhaps best
163. 356 So. 2d at 1375.
164. 359 So. 2d 965 (La. 1978). For a later case concerning the ambit of such an ex-
ception, see City of Baton Rouge v. Overton, 367 So. 2d 305 (La. 1979) (relative to a
"log book" on a machine used to administer PEI tests).
165. 359 So. 2d at 969 n.2.
166. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; LA. CONST. art. I, § 16. See 1976-1977 Term, supra note
40, at 590 & 592; Comment, Hearsay, the Confrontation Guarantee and Related Pro-
blems, 30 LA. L. REV. 651 (1970), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 388 (1974).
167. Notably, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(8) Public records and reports.-Records, reports, statements, or data compila-
tions, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth . . .(B) matters
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty
to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police of-
ficers and other law enforcement personnel ....
FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(B).
168. See Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.
1961); FED. R. EVID. 803(24) & 804(b)(5); Burley v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 319 So.
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reflected in Salley Grocer Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co.1"9 Relying on Salley Grocer, the second circuit in Greer v. Hat-
ter,1" in a land title dispute, held a 1949 affadavit by now deceased
persons admissible on the question of whether defendant's ancestor
in title was in good faith at the time she contracted a second mar-
riage in 1896. The court stressed that at the time of the trial no one
was still living who could give firsthand testimony.
The writers undoubtedly agree that under certain circumstances
the hearsay rule should be relaxed to permit the reception of
reliable, necessary evidence."' We feel, however, that reasonable
restrictions and protective safeguards similar to those incorporated
in the Federal Rules of Evidence172 should be adopted to promote
orderly development of new exceptions and protect an opponent
against unanticipated, unreliable hearsay evidence. The writers are
not persuaded that the affadavit held admissible in Greer was
reliable. There is no showing in the opinion that the affiants were
disinterested, and the fact that it was made after the suit in ques-
tion was first filed raises red flags and hard questions.
2d 334 (La. 1975), discussed in 1975-1976 Term, supra note 21, at 610, reprinted in G.
PUGH, supra note 10, at 550 (Supp. 1978); Salley Grocer Co. v. Hartford Accident & In-
dem. Co., 223 So. 2d 5 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969), discussed in 1968-1969 Term, supra note
118, at 322, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 526 (1974); C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 29, § 326, at 752-55.
169. 223 So. 2d 5 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
170. 364 So. 2d 1050 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978). See also Hardy v. Brown, 372 So. 2d
573 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
171. It should be noted that in criminal cases where evidence is offered by the pro-
secution against the defendant, admissibility of the evidence is limited by rules
relative to a defendant's right of cross-examination. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965); Comment, supra note 166. No such problem is encountered, however, where a
defendant in a criminal case seeks to introduce hearsay evidence. Instead, to deny the
defendant the right to adduce reliable, necessary hearsay evidence may violate his right
of compulsory process. See Green v. Georgia, 99 S. Ct. 2150 (1979); Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). See also authorities cited in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at
450-52 (Supp. 1978).
172. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) stipulates:
Other exceptions.-A statement not specifically covered by any of the forego-
ing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is of-
fered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However,
a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it
makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing
to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his in-
tention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and ad-
dress of the declarant.
Rule 804(b)(5) contains similar provisions.
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DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Application for Insurance-The "Entire Contract"
Requirement
Johnson v. Occidental Life Insurance Co. of California73 is an in-
teresting case involving the "entire contract" requirement relative
to suits on insurance policies, and helpfully clarifies the law as to
when an application for insurance is admissible to show material
misrepresentation on the part of the insured. Louisiana Revised
Statutes 22:618(A) provides that an application for an insurance
policy is inadmissible "unless a correct copy of the application was
attached to or otherwise made a part of the policy, or contract,
when issued and delivered." Relying on language in earlier supreme
court cases, 7 ' the First Circuit Court of Appeal had held that, to be
admissible under the statute, the application had to be physically at-
tached to the policy, and that the requirement was not satisfied if,
instead of stapling, clipping or gluing, etc., the application had been
placed "inside of the certificate cover in a sleeve provided for that
purpose." In a well-reasoned opinion authored by Justice Ad Hoc
Pike Hall, Jr., the supreme court held that the application thus plac-
ed in the certificate cover was admissible, stressing that the earlier
cases had arisen in different contexts and that the purpose underly-
ing the "entire contract" requirement of the statute was fully
satisfied, i.e., assuring "that the insured [was] in possession of the
entire contract."'7 5
PREPARATION OF DEFENSE
Right to Continuance to Prepare Defense
Under what circumstances is defense counsel entitled to a continu-
ance to prepare his case for trial? In State v. Benson' a majority
of the supreme court concluded that the trial court abused its
discretion and committed reversible error in refusing to grant
defense counsel additional time "to evaluate the added strength the
handwriting evidence would lend to the state's case, to decide
whether to use expert testimony to counter the testimony put for-
ward by the state, and to contact a suitable expert in the field.""'
The availability of three days, found the court, was insufficient time
for such purposes.
173. 368 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1979).
174. Spain v. Travelers Ins. Co., 332 So. 2d 827 (La. 1976); Fisette v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 162 La. 620, 110 So. 880 (1926).
175. 368 So. 2d at 1035.
176. 368 So. 2d 716 (La. 1979).
177. Id. at 718.
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Right to Adequate Preparation of Defense-Indigent's
Right to Investigator
In the 1977 decision of State v. Madison,178 the court stated that
"when an indigent defendant shows that his attorney is unable to
obtain existing evidence crucial to the defense, the means to obtain
it should be provided for him, and if the indigent defender system
cannot defray the expense, the State ought to supply the funds.1179
The court found, however, that defendant had failed to make the re-
quisite showing.
This past year, citing Madison, the supreme court (three justices
dissenting) granted a writ in State v. Stokes8 ' and ordered the trial
court to hold a hearing in chambers "to establish the need, if any,
for the assistance of an investigation under conditions to be set by
the trial court in order to assure the effective assistance of
counsel.''. The court's action has important implications for the
future and is, we feel, a step in the right direction.
Compulsory Process-Rights to Present a Defense
Relying heavily on Washington v. Texas'82 and its recognition of
a defendant's right to present a defense, the court in State v.
Jones8 ' held that the trial court committed reversible error in refus-
ing to order a former co-defendant (who had previously pleaded guil-
ty) to testify. No argument was made that the former co-defendant
was entitled to or would claim a privilege against self-incrimination.
The case seems completely sound.18 '
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
Civil Cases -Effect of Trial Court's Committing Prejudicial Error in
Improperly Admitting Evidence
What should a Louisiana appellate court do when, in a civil case,
178. 345 So. 2d 485 (La. 1977).
179. Id. at 490.
180. 362 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1978).
181. Id.
182. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
183. 363 So. 2d 455 (La. 1978).
184. As to what is required to establish a right to a severance in order that a co-
defendant's testimony might be utilized at trial by defendant, see State v. McGraw,
366 So. 2d 1278 (La. 1979); State v. Turner, 365 So. 2d 1352 (La. 1978). See also
1967-1968 Term, supra note 37, at 325, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 340
(1974); Note, The Use of a Witness's Privilege for the Benefit of a Defendant, 37 LA.
L. REV. 1244 (1977), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 406 (Supp. 1978). For
another case decided during the past year reversing the trial court because of what it
found to be denial of defendant's right of compulsory process, see State v. Compton,
367 So. 2d 844 (La. 1979).
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it concludes that the trial court, over objection, committed pre-
judicial error in improperly admitting certain evidence? In Beck v.
Lovell,85 a civil jury case, Judge Landry, speaking for a unanimous
panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeal, held that under such cir-
cumstances when a complete record is available, instead of reman-
ding the case for a new trial, the appellate court should make an in-
dependent evaluation of the testimony and render the judgment it
feels the' trial jury should have rendered. The court found that
because l)f the trial court's error in improperly admitting certain
evidence, the "manifest error" requirement for reversal on the facts
was inoperative.18 The approach taken in Beck certainly accords
with the prescription set forth in dictum in the 1975 Louisiana
Supreme Court decision Gonzales v. Xerox Corp.8 7
If this approach taken in Beck is correct for civil jury cases, a
fortiori it would seem to be required in non-jury civil cases, and
such was the view taken by Judge Samuel in Gordon v. City of New
Orleans,88 a court of appeal case from the fourth circuit also involv-
ing the problem.'89 The approach promotes judicial efficiency but
denies the fact finding process the benefit of evaluation of the facts
by the persons who saw and heard the witnesses; the trade-off that
results is unavoidable.
185. 361 So. 2d 245 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 802 (La. 1978).
186. For a discussion of the manifest error rule, see the important recent case of
Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1979). See also Hardy, The Manifest Error
Rule, 21 LA. L. REV. 749 (1961), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 617 (1974);
Robertson, Appellate Review of Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases, 21 LA. L. REV. 402
(1961), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 10, at 588 (1974).
187. 320 So. 2d 163 (La. 1975). See the allusion to Gonzales in Arceneaux v. Dom-
ingue, 365 So. 2d at 1334 n.2.
188. 363 So. 2d 235 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
189. Although Judge Stoulig concurred in the result reached by Judge Samuel in
the Gordon case (affirming the trial court's decision), he apparently felt that the usual
manifest error rule should apply to the trial court judgment. Judge Redmann
dissented on other grounds and did not reach the instant issue.

